Abstract. Culture has attributes of a global public good that needs to be preserved for mankind as a whole. World Culture Certificates are proposed to efficiently preserve World Heritage. The community of nations has to agree on the Global Heritage List and how much each nation is to contribute to that purpose. Each World Heritage site conserved is acknowledged through the issuance of a tradable Certificate. Countries and private firms are induced to seek sites where financial resources can be spent most productively. This leads to an efficient allocation of resources to preserve World Heritage.
World Heritage and Conservation Needs
The UNESCO Convention on World Heritage of 1972 "seeks to encourage the identification, protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity". 3 It aims to preserve monuments, natural and cultural landscapes as a legacy of the past, in order to pass this heritage on to future generations. From its very beginning the convention's intention has been directed towards the entire world. World Heritage is a clear example of a global common good: "The World Heritage List reflects the wealth and diversity of the Earth's cultural and natural heritage" (UNESCO, 2005) . The convention goes far beyond established national conservation efforts because it acknowledges that due to the free-rider problem associated with managing preservation on a purely national level the aggregate quantity of preservation is inefficiently low. A host country will pay only to preserve up to the point where the marginal national benefit equal marginal cost.
The World Heritage movement started in 1959 with the international campaign launched by UNESCO to save the Abu Simbel temples in the Nile valley. 4 At the beginning, World Heritage was directed to cultural sites but since 1968 is also includes natural sites, and since 1992 also stresses significant interactions between people and the natural environment, entitled "cultural landscapes" (UNESCO, 2005) .
This noble ideal has only been attained to a limited extent. In particular, the distribution of effort and expenditure to preserve World Heritage is inefficient. A striking fact is that in some countries a large number of most valuable heritage sites can be found that are in extremely dilapidated condition and are in urgent need of restoration but the funds to restore the sites are lacking. At the same time other countries spend a lot of resources on saving and beautifully restoring heritage sites that -in comparisonare in much less need. To give an example: In Cuba, especially in Havana, many beautiful buildings are virtually crumbling and falling apart while developed economies such as France, Germany, Austria or Switzerland spend large sums on restoring monuments of lesser importance to world heritage. The point made here is most certainly not that the funds are wasted but rather that the same amount of money could contribute much more if used for the preservation of heritage sites in some other countries. In other words: some poor countries spend too little "per unit" of world heritage saved while rich countries spend too much. From a global point of view, the situation, therefore, is clearly suboptimal and ways to improve this situation should be thought of. This paper envisions a solution to this imbalance by using and applying resources and it discusses the advantages and problems that could arise. 5 In line with UNESCO, our proposal focuses on those parts of heritage, which are considered to belong to humanity. This concept that regards cultural heritage as a global public good is normative in the sense that it is not necessarily perceived as such by the public, interest groups or the government (see below). The proposal advanced here, thus follows the intention of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, and seeks a way to achieve its goal of preservation as efficiently as possible. There are many cultural heritage sites that combine both public and private good attributes. We are not concerned here with the many cases of local cultural public goods.
The proposal advanced here, is informed by programs designed to solve the global environmental problems, such as climate change (see e.g. Tietenberg (2006) ; Stern et al. (2006) ; Antes et al. (2005) ): Incentives are provided to overcome the common pool problem of reducing externalities by coordinating action.
Another analogy is NATO whose goal is to promote the collective defense of its member states. 6 "Indicators of responsibility" have been devised to assess the relative burdens falling to the individual member states
Outline of the Proposal
The goal of the World Heritage movement should be the preservation of World Heritage sites to the largest possible extent by spending as few resources as possible. Restrictions pertaining to a minimum amount of resources spent are crucial and correspond to the very foundation of economics. Resources are limited; and this applies in particular to the resources spent on cultural preservation. The problem outlined here, that some (poor) countries spend very little on preserving their heritage, could be easily solved by compelling the richer countries to pick up the bill. However, this remains wishful thinking. It certainly cannot be a lack of information that prevents a flow of resources to the restoration of the monuments in dire need of preservation. To come back to the example above: everyone knows about the terrible state of repair of the culturally most valuable buildings in Havana but for many different reasons the flow of money does not take place. To be put on the List of World Heritage does not lead to any significant support by UNESCO. 7 Indeed, according to the official "World Heritage Information Kit" (UNESCO, 2005) "The World Heritage Fund receives a total amount each year of just under US$ 4 million" which is minimal compared to the existing needs.
A viable proposal must therefore presuppose a limited amount of resources devoted to the preservation of cultural heritage. The effort must lie in the distribution of the resources available in such a way that the world heritage is globally improved as comprehensively as possible.
The proposal consists of four steps: 
Determining What Belongs to World Heritage
The world community, i.e. the member states of the United Nations, has to agree on what they consider "World Heritage" worth protecting and conserving. UNESCO has done so in its World Heritage List. The authors are well aware that this List is the result of many compromises, and that it is also subject to political pressures and manipulations (for an econometric study see Frey and Pamini (2008) ). There are a great many open issues as to which objects of cultural heritage should be included (for instance, should it include all man-made artifacts worthy of preservation for future generations, including moveable works of art such as masterpiece paintings, or should it include only immoveable heritage objects). Here, the definition implicit in the World Heritage List has been taken as the starting point.
As of August 2008, there were 878 properties on this list, containing 679 cultural, 174 natural and 25 mixed sites in 145 countries of the world. The List is continually expanded in particular because so only two sites have ever been removed. 8 The list contains very different properties, even if one only considers its main emphasis, cultural heritage. 9 The sites range from entire cities (such as Trinidad in Cuba, Quedlinburg in Germany, Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius in the three Baltic States or Dubrovnik in Croatia) to individual buildings (such as the Acropolis in Athens, the Tower of London, the Taj Mahal or the Abbey in Lorsch, Germany).
For our proposal it is necessary that the items on the list can be compared. The experts compiling the list must indicate how many "World Heritage Units" (WHU) are involved in each site. This requires a comparison between individual aspects of various sites. The WHU must refer to the fundamental cultural importance of a site rather than to the extent of its present state of conservation. To establish such a list of World Heritage Units is certainly no easy task. The two Advisory Boards (ICOMOS and IUCN) that are compiling the List of World Heritage Sites are already implicitly assigning such criteria when they state how many of the ten selection criteria apply to what extent, and therefore how important it is to preserve a particular site. If a heritage site is in danger of disintegrating completely unless preservation efforts are undertaken, it is assigned more WHUs than a site that is in no immediate danger of irreversible damage. If an entire city with a considerable number of buildings is to be preserved, more WHUs are involved than if only a selection criteria. This paper does not criticize the choices made, though they are (as any such list) debatable (it is, for instance, unclear why Heidelberg in Germany and Stein am Rhein in Switzerland are not on the List). Nor is it taken for granted that inclusion in the List guarantees protection, as there may be adverse effects such as the overuse through increased visits by tourists (Machu Picchu being an example, see the The Economist (2007)), the redirection of funds to the disadvantage of other heritage sites, or the increased danger that such sites are explicitly sought out as targets in wars (such as e.g. Dubrovnik during the last Balkan war, see UNESCO (2005) ). Some of these aspects are discussed in Frey and Pamini (2008) . (Neue Zuercher Zeitung, 2008) , French president Sarkozy promised to lobby for the French cuisine to become part of World Heritage.
9 For an analysis of natural heritage sites see e.g. Tisdell and Wilson (2002) or Driml (2002) .
particular small building is to be preserved. If a heritage site can be preserved for the time being by a small intervention, less WHUs are assigned than if only a large intervention could save the site. WHU may be looked at as a "shopping list" indicating, for instance, that the urgent restoration of a particular building in Havana corresponds to 5 WH-units, while the general maintenance of Machu Picchu corresponds to 3 WHunits. The units correspond to the loss of global heritage if the specified project were not carried out within a given year.
The assignment of World Heritage Units to all the sites deemed worth preserving by the experts is a necessary first step in order to make World Heritage truly global.
Agreeing on the Obligations of Individual Countries
The world community has to agree about how many World Heritage Sites are to be preserved as well as on the needed contribution of each country to protect and sustain the World Heritage. The allocation of the burden is to be made in terms of World Heritage Units in order to make it comparable. Each country must be willing to contribute some share to preserve the World Heritage in terms of World Heritage Units. The individual countries are forced to be specific rather than to agree in general terms that the preservation of World Heritage is "important". Equal shares of the burden for each country would certainly be considered unfair as such an arrangement does not take into account the geographical size of a country, the size of its population, and in particular its per capita income level or wealth. As there is no world government, a consensus among the member states must be reached. Such a consensus about what is to be put on the World Heritage List and about the share to be carried by each country is likely to be reached only if the ability to pay, or the per capita income level of a country, as well as its size, is given due weight.
As has been the case with other world problems, such as the preservation of world peace or the natural environment, a consensus is not easily reached, and may even fail completely to be reached. The most likely outcome therefore will be that a few countries will carry most of the financial burden, as is the case with the general UN-budget which is overwhelmingly financed by the United States, Japan and the large European countries. The countries supposed to contribute the largest share of the World Heritage Units are unlikely to do so unless they are compensated by a larger say in the decision making process. This is analogous to the main contributors to the general UN-budget being permanent members of the Security Council where they have a larger say with respect to the decisions taken. In the case of cultural heritage, a corresponding "World Heritage Board" can be established where the main financial contributors have permanent seats while the main beneficiaries rotate to share the temporary seats.
Assigning World Heritage Certificates
Each World Heritage Unit protected is attributed a "World Heritage Certificate". Each certificate corresponds to one unit of a World Heritage saved. Whoever spends resources on the preservation of world heritage properties receives a number of certificates corresponding to the number of World Heritage Units preserved.
Cultural experts have to determine the extent to which a certain preservation activity contributes indeed to safeguarding World Heritage Units. If, for example, a preservation activity is done superficially, in an incompetent or even damaging way, no certificate is assigned. The UNESCO World Heritage Fund and the two Advisory Boards ICOMOS and IUCN are an obvious choice to administer this program.
In order to appreciate how the scheme works, it is useful to consider specific situations. In the following, three cases will be discussed.
Case A. Consider the extreme case of a country that does not have any recognized World Heritage sites but which agrees (in step 2) to contribute a particular number of Units to the preservation of World Heritage. This obligation can be met by financing the preservation of World Heritage Units abroad, and to therewith acquire World Heritage Certificates. The country has an incentive to search for World Heritage sites, which offer the highest possible number of World Heritage Certificates in return for the funds pledged. The suppliers of funds have an incentive to seek and support those World Heritage Sites most in need of preservation.
The country committing funds therewith acquires a number of Heritage Certificates documenting the fact that it has contributed to this extent to the preservation of World Heritage. If the country accumulates sufficient Heritage Certificates to meet its obligations it has acted as a good member of the global community. At the same time it has helped to efficiently secure the preservation of World Heritage.
Case B. Consider now the opposite extreme case, a country with a larger number of World Heritage Units to be preserved within its borders but with only limited or no financial means for this purpose. Such a country has an incentive to attract donors to save its sites by offering attractive opportunities to do so. It makes an effort to preserve its World Heritage Units at the lowest cost possible so that the corresponding certificates have a low price. The cheaper the price of the certificate, the more Heritage Certificates potential donors would receive for a given sum of money. The (potential) recipient country is motivated to become active and to make internationally known what sites it has, and what the financial requirements are for preserving them. The applicants for funds have an incentive to become active and to therefore provide the most efficient preservation of World Heritage Sites.
Case C. A country has agreed to preserve within its borders a given number of World Heritage Units in step 2. However, cultural experts have classified these sites to be of (relatively) little importance. To save national cultural sites provides few Heritage Certificates in contrast to preserving Heritage sites abroad. The decision makers in this country are confronted with a trade-off. They can spend the money designated for cultural preservation for national sites, in which case they accumulate only a few World Heritage Certificates. Alternatively, they can spend the funds to preserve foreign World Heritage Sites that offer cheaper certificates, thus they can more easily fulfill their international obligations. In most cases, a mixed solution will be the best: some money will be spent on domestic sites for which a unit of money has most effect on preservation (i.e. where the Certificates are relatively cheap) but it would be a waste of money to keep spending on domestic sites when much cheaper World Heritage Certificates may be acquired by spending the money on foreign sites with much greater effect (and therefore cheap certificates per unit of money). The scheme thus takes into account the marginal productivities of spending money on preserving sites and gives financial incentives to individual countries to spend money, designated for preservation, where it is most needed according to the evaluation of the cultural experts.
Trading World Heritage Certificates
So far only monetary contributions to the preservation of World Heritage sites were considered. Opening up a market in which to trade the certificates increases the probability that such sites will be preserved, especially in developing countries. Poor countries may acquire World Heritage Certificates by specializing in preserving World Heritage sites. The preservation of cultural and natural heritage sites is a laborintensive activity in which poor countries with much hidden or open unemployment have a relative advantage. 10 Such a country may engage in a program with the goal of saving the maximum possible number of World Heritage Units within its borders. They thereby acquire World Heritage Certificates, which they can sell to countries that have less productive possibilities to preserve World Heritage. A developing country may sell its services to produce World Heritage Units at a favorable price in any country enabling it to acquire Certificates. If the number exceeds the sum agreed on in step 2, they can sell the surplus on the open market.
Moreover, for-profit firms may become active and offer to undertake the preservation of specific World Heritage sites. They will be compensated through the certificates acquired, which they can sell in the market. This opens a new area of activity for private enterprise even in cases in which heritage is a public good, i.e.
10 But expert guidance is also needed so that the preservation activity leads to World Heritage Certificates. This can be achieved by hiring foreign experts, and to train the work force to do the preservation work according to the standards set. where the benefits of its existence cannot be privately exploited. 11 The scheme also establishes competition between public actors, which so far have had a monopolistic situation in most countries and areas of public heritage preservation.
On the demand side, Heritage Certificates enable private organizations, in particular NGOs devoted to the preservation of culture, to directly participate in saving disregarded World Heritage sites rather than having to rely on political lobbying with uncertain outcomes. They can acquire as many certificates as they choose which tends to raise their price and provides an incentive to governments and private firms to undertake additional preservation efforts.
Tradeable World Heritage Certificates have the advantage of producing generally accessible knowledge about which sites should be preserved; they profit from the Hayekian process of generating information through markets.
Political Feasibility
A few years ago a scheme such as the one that has been suggested here, based on tradable international certificates, would have been considered outlandish. But circumstances have changed, mainly due to the successful introduction of such schemes as the ones for environmental protection. 12 The goal is the same: to achieve maximum effect globally with the lowest cost of resources. The certificate system proposed here is in one respect more feasible than some of the tradable environmental schemes because the number of World Heritage sites is very large and so trading is not hampered by a low number of traders and monopolistic distortions (see e.g. Ellerman and Buchner (2007)). As environmental certificates have slowly started to be appreciated by politicians and the public, it could be expected that a similar scheme for cultural preservation would also be acceptable.
Nevertheless, much opposition is to be expected. In most countries, "culture" is still considered a "national affair". Many people are convinced that each country should, first and foremost, care for its own cultural sites. As the funds for these preservation activities are normally quite limited, this means in effect that all is spent on national sites but possibly with strongly decreasing marginal returns. Only on special occasions when a spectacular cultural monument in a foreign country is to be saved (such as the Abu Simbel temple), a country's decision makers are prepared to spend money for that purpose abroad. The argument that the issue serves not the preservation of national culture but the culture of humankind as a whole probably carries little weight in environments fixated on national issues.
Our proposal for World Culture Certificates may be opposed because the sites selected are treated as merit goods whose value are determined by a set of experts chosen by UNESCO. However, the culture certificate scheme proposed here does not depend on who determines the list; it could also be achieved through a democratic process. Our proposal serves to achieve an efficient use of resources to protect the international public good of World Heritage, however this term is defined.
Interest groups concerned with preserving culture will strongly oppose the globalization underlying the proposed scheme, as they are -at least up to the present -almost entirely organized nationally. Seen from that point of view, to globally maximize the extent of cultural preservation, achieved through a given sum of money could be considered to betray a country's interests.
However, not all organized groups that are politically powerful will oppose the Heritage Certificate scheme. The more people travel abroad and visit foreign cultural monuments the more interested will be the firms engaged in international tourism that the respective cultural monuments are well preserved. They will welcome such a scheme. 13 More generally, globalization cannot be stopped and it can be expected that more and more persons embrace points of view that go beyond the sole interests of their own nation. The preservation of the culture 11 Private activities have, of course, played a major role to preserve cultural heritage in cases in which the benefits of the sites could be privately exploited, especially for tourism.
12 See e.g. Insley (2003); Tietenberg (2006) ; Antes et al. (2005); Krysiak (2008) . 13 But the national tourist boards will oppose it because they benefit from the money being spent for monuments in their own country and region.
of humankind is likely to become increasingly appreciated.
Conclusions
The World Culture Certificates proposed here intend to maximize the effect of the financial resources spent on the preservation of World Heritage sites. At present, some (rich) countries spend a lot of money on the preservation of cultural monuments that are of only secondary importance while at the same time in other (poor) countries highly valuable cultural monuments fall into ruins for lack of money. In regard to the preservation of humankind's cultural goods, this is a waste of resources. The World Culture Certificate scheme induces nations to spend the money where it produces the greatest effect on preserving world heritage. The community of nations, as embodied by the United Nations, has to establish how many World Heritage Units each nation is prepared to save. Each World Heritage Unit saved anywhere in the world is acknowledged by a certificate. The cost of a certificate is the lower the less expensive it is to accomplish saving a World Heritage Site. It is, therefore, advantageous to countries not to only concentrate on saving their national heritage (which may be very expensive due to decreasing returns) but also to seek sites where funds can be expended most productively and therewith the World Heritage Certificates can be acquired most inexpensively. This leads to an efficient allocation of resources from a global point of view. Poor countries with only very limited available funds to protect their cultural heritage can commit to protecting their monuments and to therewith acquire certificates they will be able to sell in the market. As the preservation of cultural monuments is a labor-intensive activity, the certificate scheme offers a new way for poor countries to develop economically, and at the same time allows them to preserve their cultural heritage.
A major advantage of World Heritage Certificates is that actors interested in preserving the "earth's cultural and natural heritage" can do so directly, effectively and in a sustainable manner. Under present conditions the preservation of the global cultural heritage often depends on political uncertainties: sometimes the international community can be mobilized to rescue a particular site (as was the case for Abu Simbel) but in many cases such mobilization is ineffective or comes late. Moreover, private firms may engage in saving World Heritage sites by acquiring certificates whose contribution to preserving World Heritage has been approved by experts.
The proposal of World Culture Certificates advanced here is certainly only one possibility to protect the global heritage of culture. It needs to be considered and examined in contrast to other attempts (which are, however, sadly lacking) to reach the same goal. Many arguments against the propagated scheme are possible. An important one is that the organization in charge, UNESCO, suffers from all the problems Public Choice theory associates with large bureaucracies (see, in general, Mueller (2003) , and for the case of heritage Peacock and Rizzo (2008) 
Introduction
The 2007 US sub-prime crisis and subsequent world financial crisis are likely have a variety of different contributing causes, including a property price bubble, a change in regulatory objectives and practice, Greenspan-era lax monetary policy combined with the artificiallyundervalued Chinese currency, the mass securitisation of risky mortgages, the rapid expansion of the credit derivatives market and the mispricing of liquidity risk by rating agencies. 2 This paper investigates an additional possible contributing cause: interbank competition, or more specifically, the possibility that the nature and level of competition between banks can influence financial stability. The role of interbank competition in the crisis has yet to be fully considered by analysts and policymakers, but has been an area of theoretical and empirical academic investigation since at least the early 1990s. As noted recently in Berger et al. (2009), there exist two competing views on the competition-stability relationship. The traditional view is that competition encourages bankers to take on high-risk projects in an effort to squeeze a profit, whilst bankers with market power are more risk averse as they stand to lose their monopoly profits in the event of failure. The revisionist view is that competition drives down interest rates, reducing moral hazard and adverse selection problems among borrowers, thus increasing loan repayment rates and stability. Despite the best efforts of both camps, the exact nature of the relationship remains much debated.
Part of the reason why studies come to different conclusions is that they define and measure competition in different ways. This is a forgivable sin. As this paper demonstrates, finding an appropriate empirical measure that is simultaneously sensitive to theoretical concerns and the reality of what can be measured on the ground is fraught with difficulty. Standard paradigms of competition are inappropriate for the analysis of the banking sector due to the presence of strong information asymmetries in financial markets (Freixas and Rochet, 2008; Carletti, 2008) . It is these asymmetries, and primarily those between borrowers and lenders, that simultaneously provide banks with their raison d'être and their source of fragility. As a result, and unlike in most other markets, there is no discernible relationship between the number of players and the competitive outcome. Theoretically, a market with just two banks can be very competitive if customers can easily switch their business between them. Conversely, a market with hundreds of different banks can be very uncompetitive if customers are unable to do so. This paper does two things. First it explores the key conclusions of the recent competitionstability banking literature. Then it measures the nature and level of competition between microfinance banks operating in the Netherlands just after the Great War. The latter is an attempt to find an econometric solution to some of the methodological shortcomings of the former. The Dutch rural market for small-scale deposits is an interesting case study with which to explore interbank competition because its peculiarities permit the isolation of the two key factors that influence competition: transaction and information switching costs, the first associated in this case with geographic distance and the second with religious segregation. The ownership structure of the banks under investigation -they are all cooperatively owned by their customersbrings particular theoretical challenges as their business objectives differ significantly from conventional banks. But in applying intuition from the new industrial organisation literature to the specific historical context of Dutch interwar financial markets, this paper attempts to meet these challenges head on; it abandons the traditional structure-conduct-performance approach and instead analyses competitive outcomes directly using appropriate performance measures. It concludes that both transaction and information switching cost are important determinants of banks' market power and speculates that today's banking markets may require a unique approach to competition policy.
Literature review
The nature of the relationship between competition and stability is controversial. The introduction characterises a debate between traditionalists and revisionists. Boyd et al. (2009) argue older studies only find in favour of the traditional wisdom because they focus exclusively on the liabilities side of banks' balance sheets (deposits) whilst ignoring their assets (loans). Berger et al. (2009) argue the two competing views are not incompatible and can work together. This section presents some of the recent debate and then discusses why studies -old and new -yield such different results.
A dynamic model of asymmetric information of the type proposed in Keeley (1990) and used more recently in Allen and Gale (2004) suggests that there is a tradeoff between competition and risk, i.e. competition increases bankers' risk-taking incentives. In such a model, perfectly competitive banking markets (i.e. with no switching costs) imply zero future profits; the socalled "charter value" is zero. With no potential to make future profits, there is little incentive for banks to finance low-risk projects. Bankers instead gravitate towards high-risk, high-yield projects as they have "nothing to lose". Conversely, if banks have some degree of market power and therefore a charter value, then there is likely a higher aversion to risk as bankers will now have "something to lose".
Of course, this assumes that bankers are able to choose their exposure to risk. Due to information asymmetries, this is perhaps not an obvious assumption to make, and the reverse one, found in the work of Boyd et al (2004 Boyd et al ( , 2005 Boyd et al ( and 2009 , yields the opposite result, namely that competition and aversion to risk are complementary. Competition is also likely to lower interest rates and therefore may improve the quality of loan applications and lower the need for banks to ration credit in the way discussed in chapter 5 of Freixas and Rochet (2008) . More profitable bank customers may in turn themselves have a lower incentive to take risks and potentially lose their own charter value (their "excess capital"), therefore lowering the probability of loan defaults and increasing bank stability. Conversely, the higher interest rates likely to result from lower levels of competition will likely draw riskier applicants (adverse selection) and induce borrowers to choose riskier projects (moral hazard), as noted in Vives (2008) .
Perhaps the biggest problem for empirical economists has been how to measure interbank competition. There can be little relationship between the number and relative size of competitors and the level of competition in banking. Standard competition measures such as concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices are not particularly useful for this reason. Instead, the key variables on which to focus are those that affect switching costs, the costs to customers of switching between financial service providers. Switching costs include both transaction costs and information costs. Taking the market for loans as an example, a high-quality, low-risk borrower may be discouraged from switching to a competing bank if he is likely to incur a high monetary penalty for ending his contract. Additionally, the competing bank's unfamiliarity with his financial record may result in a less favourable mortgage rate. The presence of both transaction and information costs may lock customers -even high-quality, low-risk ones -into using a certain bank, regardless of the economic advantages of its competitors.
A number of recent empirical studies of the competition-stability relationship are discussed and compared in Degryse et al. (2009) . This excellent review documents a new empirical industrial organisation literature that has begun to circumvent the problems associated with Herfindahl-type competition indices by measuring firms' conduct more directly, without explicitly having to take market structure into account. Competition measures new to the banking literature include the use of the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H -statistic in e.g. Claessens and Laeven (2004) , where competition is defined as the sum of elasticities of the total interest revenue of banks with respect to their factor input prices, and the as-yet little explored relative profit differences measure introduced by Boone (2008) , where firms are modelled as being punished more harshly for inefficiency the more competitive is the market in which they operate. However, as in the theoretical debate, the conclusions of these empirical studies vary greatly and depend largely on the measure chosen and data used. 3
In an historical study of Depression-era US banks that escaped the Degryse et al. review, Carlson and Mitchener (2006) measure the effect of bank branching on financial stability. Like the revisionists, they posit that competition could have a positive effect on financial stability, this time through a "competitive shakeout process" similar to that which underlines Boone (2008) whereby branching forces weaker banks to exit through merger or voluntary liquidation. They test their hypothesis using a natural experiment, comparing those US states that permitted branching with those that did not. They find the positive effect competition had on banking stability was larger than the positive effect of diversification. However, their measure of competition does not take switching costs into account; they rely instead a Herfindahl-type measure.
This present study is similar to Carlson and Mitchener (2006) in that it analyses historical data about an extreme market structure. It differs in that it measures competition in a way that is more sensitive to the theoretical concerns discussed in this section regarding what constitutes interbank competition. Like the new empirical industrial organisation literature, it does not make the implicit assumption underlying much of the work of the traditionalists that market structure causes performance. Instead it attempts to infer conduct directly from performance measures. It exploits the peculiarities of the Dutch market for small-scale rural deposits to develop separate measures of transaction costs in terms of geographical distance (following Degryse and Ongena, 2005) and information costs in terms of religious segregation.
Historical context
Data concerning the Dutch market for smallscale rural savings in the early twentieth century offers relatively unique opportunities for the study of interbank competition in that they permit the isolation of transaction costs from information costs due to the country's social, political and economic segregation based on religious affiliation, a process that commenced in the late nineteenth century and is known as the verzuiling (pillarisation). 4 The Dutch case is also interesting in that a financial crisis occurred there immediately following the time period under analysis in this paper, a crisis in which different types of bank had wildly different survival chances.
Small independent cooperative Raiffeisen banks sprang up all over rural areas of the Netherlands from the late 1890s (Jonker, 1997) . The geographic penetration of these banks -which in Dutch were called boerenleenbanken or farmers' lending banks -was almost complete by the end of the Great War. Figure 1 depicts the location of 1,145 cooperative microfinance institutions operating in the country in 1919, practically the entire population of such banks. Their only viable formal competitors were the nutsspaarbanken, philanthropic urban savings houses that could feasibly be accessed by those farmers residing in the rural-urban fringes of the north of the country, and the Rijkspostspaarbank, the state's post office savings bank, which by the end of the war was easily accessible to all potential savers through the postal service. Boerenleenbanken likely also competed with informal financial service providers, e.g. shopkeepers. Conventional private and joint-stock banks did not serve this market.
Many of the institutional attributes of the Netherlands' Raiffeisen banks originate from their German cousins, which are described in detail in Guinnane (2001) . Each bank was independent and theoretically operated in a narrowlydefined local market. Farmers who wished to borrow money from these institutions first had to seek membership and therefore stand liable for their cooperative's potential future losses. Farmers who wished merely to deposit savings with a boerenleenbank were not obliged to join and stand liable. Banks were generally small operations: in 1919, each bank held an average of 194 thousand guilders of deposits and made 67 thousand guilders of loans to members. The sector as a whole held approximately 4.2 percent of all assets in the banking system in 1918 ( Van Zanden, 1997) . Banks were managed part-time by cooperatives' members and most had very limited opening hours. They did not pay dividends to members, depositing any profits, which were tiny, in a reserve fund.
Almost all banks belonged to one of three cooperative networks, the central banks of which acted as their auditing authorities, clearing houses and lenders-of-last-resort. Central banks also invested any excess savings lent to them by member banks by buying safe securities such as government bonds. The biggest difference with the German setup was that these cooperative networks were not principally regional but instead religious (Protestant or Catholic), a consequence of the verzuiling. Figure 2 shows that two Christian sects dominated certain areas of the country but shared others. Many villages had two banks, in theory one for each sect.
This paper looks at two things, each of which addresses issues discussed in the previous section. First, it establishes whether there was interbank competition in the Dutch rural banking sector and, if so, how this competition manifested itself. Then, it speculates whether there is any implication of the level of observed competition on the sector's subsequent relative stability during a financial crisis that plagued the country in the early 1920s, a period of prolonged price deflation. As the economic conduct of individual banks is not directly observed, this analysis instead infers conduct from measures of performance and is therefore conceptually similar to the ideas behind the new empirical industrial organisation literature. The theoretical idea is that the process of interbank competition should homogenise banks' performance, controlled for various social, economic and institutional factors. Banks whose performance diverges significantly from the norm are hypothesised to benefit from some market power due to switching costs, or suffer from lack thereof.
The financial penalties for borrowing from an institution other than the bank with which farmers already had a relationship was very high: a minimum of one year of continued liability. The analysis here therefore instead focusses on the liabilities side of these banks' balance sheets, where this switching cost was wholly absent and hence the potential for discovering competition more realistic. Whilst there is no extant analysis of interbank competition in this sector, a reading of the historical literature (summarised in Sluyterman et al., 1998) suggests that that there was very little due to market segmentation by religious affiliation; a farmer would apparently bank only with a cooperative that subscribed to his personal religious beliefs. This could be interpreted as prohibitively high information costs of switching to a bank affiliated to another Christian sect, e.g. a Protestant farmer may have difficulty gaining access to the informal churchcentred Catholic community which runs his village's other bank. Whilst plausible, this segmentation hypothesis remains unproven. Indeed, anecdotal evidence suggests farmers based their choice of bank on other factors too. 5 Whether social disincentives of switching trump economic ones, such as improved interest rates or opening hours, has yet to be formally and systematically tested. The analysis that follows is a first attempt at doing so.
Whilst Boone (2008) uses measures of profit to infer conduct, this present analysis instead focusses on the growth in banks' savings deposits. The latter is conceptually equivalent to the former for the case of cooperative banks, which unlike conventional banks are not profit maximising business organisations. Where a conventional firm seeks to maximise returns for its owners and managers, a cooperative's owners and managers instead maximise their returns by minimising those of the cooperative organisation that they co-use, co-own and co-manage. 6 This is achieved principally through interest rate policy: charging below-market interest on loans and paying above-market interest on savings, a business strategy that at the time greatly annoyed the Nederlandsche Bank, the Dutch bank of issue and de facto financial regulator (Sluyterman et al., 1998) .
The principal aim of boerenleenbanken was therefore not to turn a profit, but instead to have large deposit holdings (liabilities). Each bank's excess customer deposits were lent to their central bank for only a small mark-up, usually amounting to just one quarter or one half of one percent. Combined with low operational costs thanks to e.g. employing voluntary managers, it was only economies of scale in deposit gathering that afforded boerenleenbanken the possibility of lending the small portion of their liabilities that was lent out to their members at "mates' rates".
Econometric analysis
The data used in the present competition analysis pertains to each and every boerenleenbank operating in 1919 that was a member of a cooperative network. 7 1919 was the first relatively stable year following the end of the Great War -a war in which the Netherlands was politically neutral -and was two years prior to the start of a financial crisis. The sources used are: financial tables compiled and published by coop-eratives' central banks, sociopolitical data from the 1920 census, contemporary agricultural survey data published by the Dutch government's Directie van de Landbouw (agricultural directorate), and topographic data from the Dutch land registry. 8 The statistical tables report the key balance sheet items of each bank, including cash holdings, balance with their central bank, short-and long-term deposits and loans and the number of account holders and liable members. Census data reports each area's religious make-up and agricultural survey data reveals their main land uses and farm ownership structure. The topographical data is used to calculate the geographic distance between all banks, a measure of transport costs. 9 Figure  3 plots Epanechnikov kernel density distributions of the distances in kilometres between all boerenleenbanken and their fifteen nearest neighbours. It shows that the variance in distance increases with every additional nearest neighbour and suggests some geographic clustering of banks. The aim of regression model (1) is to measure the effect of switching costs on the percentage growth in savings held by bank i over the financial year 1919 (growth i ), or to identify the source of banks' market power. Two independent variables are included to capture transaction switching costs associated with transport: the distance in kilometres to the closest neighbouring bank to i that belongs to the same network (distown i ), and the distance to the closest neighbour that belongs to a different network (distother i ). Two independent variables are included to capture information switching costs associated with religious segregation: dummy variables that equal one if and only if bank i belongs to the network of a Catholic-affiliated central bank (cathbank i ) and is located in a municipality whose inhabitants predominantly belong to the same religion as that with which the bank is affiliated (majbank i ).
Regression model (2) adds nine additional independent variables to model (1) in order to control for factors that do not relate to switching costs directly but instead relate to the economic attractiveness of bank i to potential savers and the economic circumstance of (potential) savers themselves. These are: the interest rate paid out to cooperatives by their central bank on any excess savings (IR i ) to control for depositor returns, a ratio of the number of depositors to the number of liable members (D/M i ) to control for potential principal-agent problems, 10 a ratio of the amount of guilders deposited to the amount loaned out to members (d/l i ) to control for leverage, the number of savings accounts (accs i ) to control for size, the number of years since foundation (age i and age 2 i ) to control for first-mover advantage and life-cycle effects, the 8 See the data appendix for a comprehensive description of data sources. 9 Distance is an imperfect measure of transport costs as it does not take actual road layout into account. However, as the distances involved are small and as the country lacks any significant topographical variation in e.g. altitude, distance is a good approximation.
10 A large mismatch between these two groups may result in a high incentive for depositors to run on their bank in some bad state of nature as, unlike members, they only stand to lose their deposits in the event of failure, which they can attempt to withdraw ahead of time. A closer match implies that all depositors are liable members and therefore have little incentive to run on their bank as they anyway stand to lose more than just their deposits in the event of failure.
percentage of the population local to bank i that is census-declared Catholic (perccath i ) to control for sociopolitical factors, and the percentage of land local to bank i that is used for agriculture (percagri i ) and the percentage of farms that are owner-occupied (percown i ) to control for regional differences in the structure of the rural economy.
Regression model (3) adds region fixed effects to model (2), but is otherwise identical. The effects correspond to 83 different agricultural regions as defined by the Directie van de Landbouw in 1912 and used by policymakers throughout the early twentieth century. Each region was judged in this survey to constitute a distinct type of agricultural business. Table 1 reports summary statistics of all variables used in the regression analysis. The deposit growth rate varies considerably across the sample: between -85 and 161 percent. The distance to banks' closest neighbours ranges from being practically next door to 29 kilometres for those in the same network and 75 kilometres for those in another network. The number of Catholic and non-Catholic banks are roughly equal; the majority of banks are located in areas in which they are (de facto) affiliated to the religious majority. The control variables all have a considerable range, with newly established banks having a value of zero for age, and often having a value zero for the depositor to member ratio, total deposits to total loans ratio, number of savings accounts and age. Table 2 reports the regression results of all three models. The coefficients of the distance variables (β 1 and β 2 ) are positive and significant in model (1), suggesting that larger distances bring more market power. However, the relative differences in their size suggests that banks compete less with neighbours of different networks and more with those of the same network. The addition of the nine control variables in models (2) and (3) much reduces the significance of the second distance measure, further strengthening this finding. The p-values of the coefficients of the religious segregation dummy variables (β 3 and β 4 ) in models (1) and (2) suggests that it matters little for deposit growth whether bank i is Catholic or Protestant or is located in an area populated predominantly by farmers of the same or a different religion as that of the bank. The addition of fixed effects in model (3) improves the significance of both coefficients and suggests that switching to a bank affiliated with a different Christian sect within the same farming region is costly; there may be some information advantages of being a minority bank, e.g. it may be less costly for such a bank's managers to monitor its customers. Overall then, transaction costs associated with distance appear to grant banks a degree of market power, and, to a lesser degree, so do information costs associated with religious segregation. 11
The addition of the control variables in models (2) and (3) significantly improves the regression overall. Interest rates are not significant as rate differences between banks are only observed in the provinces of Holland, which are accounted for by regional fixed effects. The depositor to member ratio is negative, large and significant and suggests that banks possessing a larger mismatch are viewed as less trustworthy by saving farmers. Although significant, banks' leverage matters little, nor does the size of their ownership base. The joint effect of the banks' age variables takes an inverted U-shape and suggests some type of life-cycle effect rather than a first mover effect. In model (2), a bank locality's sociopolitical makeup matters little, but the proportion of land that is used for agriculture and the proportion of farms that are owner-occupied do matter. These last two results are as expected, as boerenleenbanken were largely established specifically by and for such customers. Also as expected, the addition of regional fixed effects -an alternative way of con-11 Note that the geographic location of banks is endogenous in that banks are likely set up where there is some demand for their deposit services. This should systematically bias results in the opposite direction to that which would show an effect of distance because larger distances imply few potential customers. A significant effect of distance in the expected direction is found despite this bias, further strengthening this paper's results. Note: 60 (new) banks that took their first deposits in 1919 -and therefore experienced a deposit growth rate of infinite percent -were eliminated from the original 1141 bank sample after distances were calculated.
trolling for regional differences in the economy -significantly reduces the significance of these last two coefficients in model (3). Multicollinearity is not a significant problem with the model specifications used. The most significant missing variable in the regressions is probably the interest rate on savings paid out to individual depositors. Whilst this closely tracked the interest rate that banks themselves received on deposits made at their central bank (IR i ), there was nevertheless room for limited local variation. Unfortunately, such interest rate data have been lost for the vast majority of cooperative banks.
An alternative interpretation of the cathbank i dummy that may be problematic for this paper's conclusions is the possibility that social differences between the Christian sects led to different propensities to save, an example of the Weber (2003) Protestant ethic thesis.
In summary, this analysis lends support to the view that cooperatives did compete with neighbours in their local area and that some of the market power they enjoyed was due to their geographic location. This result also provides some evidence for the verzuiling market segregation wisdom. However, the importance of the the control variables in explaining deposit growth suggests that farmers were "economically rational" in that they deposited their savings where it was most beneficial and least risky for them to do so. The theoretical undesirability of traditional measures of competition aside, this result could not have been gleaned from structure-conduct-performance analysis because it is impossible to define these banks' geographic market given the available data.
All classes of bank suffered severe difficulties during the Dutch financial crisis of the early 1920s. These difficulties took the form of bank runs, stock crashes and state interventions, including forced mergers between urban cooperatives. Why boerenleenbanken did so well comparatively is the subject of ongoing research. Important factors are likely the absence of moral hazard resulting from their ownership structure and small size and their customers' recent comparative prosperity due to increased war-time German demand for agricultural produce.
Without similar competition analysis of other parts of the Dutch banking sector, the impact of interbank competition on stability remains unclear in the Dutch case. However, a reading of the historical literature on the market for small-scale deposits and loans for urban dwellers (e.g. Stoffer, 1985) suggests there was far more competition there. And transaction switching costs were significantly lower as distance to neighbouring banks was virtually nill. The Dutch case may yet prove to lend support for the traditionalist competition-stability tradeoff view.
Concluding remarks
The structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organisation has largely fallen out of fashion among economist, also those working on applied problems in banking (Degryse et al., 2009 ). The main criticism of this paradigm is that structure is treated as exogenous to the system whilst in reality firms' conduct influences market structure in a feedback loop. This paper attempts to avoid this criticism by inferring conduct directly from performance. Its main finding is that banks glean market power principally from transaction switching costs, but also from information switching costs. This is much in line with the conclusions of Degryse and Ongena (2005), who find that distance is an important explanatory variable in their analysis of the market for loans in Belgium in the mid 1990s. Without additional data collection it is impossible to say whether in the Dutch case, the type of financial institution analysed performed well during a severe financial crisis exactly because of the level of competition or because of something else. This is the next step in ongoing research.
Whilst current switching rates in retail banking appear not to be as high as in other financial markets, they are nevertheless high in histori-cal terms. 12 This may be partly because the widespread adoption of electronic banking has lead to a so-called "death of distance". Any transaction switching cost are today less due to distance and more due to e.g. administration following the revision of automated payment channels. Policymakers have recently attempted to reduce switching costs in banking through active intervention. In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading's market study into personal current accounts (OFT 2008b) and subsequent High Court test case have forced high street banks to start to rethink their charging regimes in an effort to make them more transparent to customers and thus reduce information switching costs.
What are the lessons to be learnt from the Dutch case for policymakers today? Competition concerns raised in OFT (2008a) regarding the merger of Lloyds TSB and HBOS were dismissed by politicians desperate to prevent further collapse of the UK financial system in the wake of a severe world crisis. Whilst consumer rights groups expressed much concern about the use of the so-called "failing firm defence" in this and similar cases, perhaps an active reduction in competition is what the financial system needed; if the traditional wisdom of the competition-stability tradeoff literature is correct, then "distance, reanimated" should help make bankers more averse to risk. But, as this paper argues, a reduction in the number of players does not necessarily reduce competitive pressure on banks if switching costs are also considered. Europe's competition commissioner has said that EU competition rules 'are fit to the current test of the banking crisis' (Kroese, 2008) . As long as competition authorities focus on switching costs rather than Herfindahl indices and exceptions to competition policy on stability grounds are continued to be made, she may prove correct.
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Allen, Franklin and Douglas Gale (2004) (Gambetta, 1993) , Making Sense of Suicide Missions (Gambetta, 2005) and, most recently, The Codes of the Underworld (Gambetta, 2009 [Diego Gambetta (DG)] I think economists like stylised models, or like to model stylised facts, in which payoffs are fairly clear and in which there is very little intrusion from a more complicated social world. The criminal world cannot count on complex institutions, or good character and social norms as much as we can to regulate behaviour. This gives it a simplicity and starkness which makes it very good raw material for thinking about many economic problems. You can catch humans before institutions or when their institutions are weak. Also, people in the criminal world tend to operate at the margins much more than we do. We have a lot of slack so we can make mistakes; our lives are far less constrained by incentive compatibility (as the jargon would put it) than the lives of criminals.
[MN] Your work relates to information economics. Can you explain the connection between this and criminals?
[DG] Precisely the lack of an institutional framework, or the weakness of an institutional framework, forces criminals to pay a lot of attention to signs. There is nothing in the institutional framework in which they move which can easily simplify their lives and tell them whom they could trust, who is an undercover agent and who is tougher than they are. There is a lot of asymmetric information floating around in their lives and it is not just occasional, it is constant.
If we were in a criminal world and I was talking to you I would have to make checks on you. I would have to ask: Who is this woman? Why does she want to talk to me? These questions are solved for us by the fact that you are a graduate student at Nuffield and I work here too so you have been selected in one way and I in another. We reduce the uncertainty for one another so I am not feeling paranoid about you but if we were in the criminal world I would have to try to understand all the information I can gather about you to decide if I can trust you or not. We tend to picture criminals as men of action but if you think about it, since the costs of making mistakes are so high, the successful ones need to be very subtle in controlling the information they give out, veiling their ways but also being very good at reading information from the world around them. In this way, the economics of information is crucial.
Crazy or Rational?
[MN] For me, your important insight has been to uncover the logic lying behind human behaviour, which on the surface, looks irrational. What is your concept of rationality?
[DG] First of all, I never tire to make a sharp distinction between rationality and self interest, which in traditional economic work tend to be kept so closely together that it is easy to forget they are two different things. You may have the most altruistic motives on earth and you may still be perfectly rational in pursuing them. However, the case of criminals is interesting for the standard economic assumptions because in the underworld rationality and self-interest really tend to go together.
Some people comment that I have applied the rational choice model to the study of the Sicilian Mafia and I feel myself sometimes uncertain because the pure model requires a very clear intentionality: I do this because I want to achieve this and this is rational because doing x is the best way to achieve y. Rationality has to do with the means.
However, in some of the domains that I have explored I cannot be sure that intentionality always comes in, you may just be of a certain type that happens to have skills and features that fit a business. For instance, the story I make about incompetence being a good sign that you may be trustworthy because if you cannot do anything then you have to stick to your friends and the agreements you make with them if you want to get anywhere. What triggered this kind of thinking for me was observing mobsters and Italian academics not being shy of boasting their incompetence in many domains. That makes sense of the fact that they boast about their incompetence. It may be a rationalisation, which I am imposing from outside, of a behaviour that simply happens to work. The test required to see if a behaviour is rational or not can be weaker than requiring full intentionality. Also, if an effective behaviour does emerege unintentionally the agents themselves may become aware of this and use it intentionally the next time round. You could turn the thing on its head and ask: should the boasting of their incompetence be harmful, would they still do it? The answer is probably not. So the fact that they do it is simply because it has either no effect or has a benefit.
I prefer to handle rationality tools flexibly rather than firmly. Even so, a sense of what is rational is crucial if you want to see deviation otherwise everything looks possible. Rational choice models are of crucial importance for the social sciences.
[MN] Do you see a unifying motif connecting your early work on education and equality, your later work on the mafia and subsequent work on trust and communication?
[DG] The work on education belongs to a different era. It belongs to a time in which in the social sciences a lot of scholars that came from a marxist or from a functionalist tradition, at least in fields which were not economics, tended to have this view of people as being fairly passive, pushed from behind, in which the reasoning agent was absent. So for me that study was a way to break with that mode which had shaped my early university education. There were social classes and big forces. It was all very macro. I wanted to show that you could not make sense of peoples actions unless you also took into account reasoning and payoffs, the effect of social norms and so on. It was a move from the macro to the micro.
Whereas the other cluster of studies is somewhere inbetween being interested in Southern Italy as arguably one of the most puzzling phenomenon of underdeveploment and the fact that the south of Italy is in the same nation as my country of origin (I come from the north). Given that it is part of a developed nation, the fact that it struggles with development is more puzzling than if it belonged to a country that is entirely underdeveloped. It was the closest thing I could understand the least. That gave me an interest in studying trust (or rather distrust) and an interest in studying the mafia but then there were things I did not understand in the criminal world that lead me to study signalling theory. I spent several years with the late Michael Bacharach working on signalling theory which I think is an extremely powerful tool though extremely difficult to understand and use well.
[MN] Can you give an example of how you have used signalling theory?
[DG] I used it first in an ethnographic study of taxi drivers who work in very dangerous cities so they are very alert to danger (Gambetta and Hamill, 2005) . We studied Belfast and New York City, two cities in which taxi drivers have been attacked enough to make them very alert. The question there was: What kind of sign do they attend to when they decide whether to pick someone up hailing a cab? It was an application of the theory in the sense that our expectation was that they would look at signs that are difficult to fake. Signs that if you were not a genuine passenger you would have costs to fake being one.
For instance , it would be difficult for an I.R.A. or Loyalist paramilitary intent on harming you to disguise himself as an old lady. So, gender and age are good signs if they are associated to good behaviour because they are very costly to fake. Taxi drivers are interesting because they have to make very fast judgements on very little information. If they make a mistake in one way they do not earn their living and if they make a mistake in another way they lose their earnings or worse. They have very strong constraints, which makes them very cognitively alert. They are probably unique in both dealing with lots of strangers and to let them in their cab, in close proximity, showing their back to the passengers.
Then I used it to understand the way in which undercover agents work in order to fool the organisation they want to infiltrate and how the organisation which fears to be infiltrated uses it to screen people. In my latest book, I also used it to understand the micro-dynamics of interpersonal violence in prisons, violence both towards others and towards self. The theory is very elegant in making simple predicitons about what signal you should and should not read and emit if you are the truthful signaler or if you are not.
But the real crux is to find fields of application because the theory works on only eminently fine details. "Application" is a word often deemed to refer to a second class operation in the social sciences. By contrast, I think that anyone can think of a formally good model if sufficiently trained but very few people can do anything with it. There was a well known Cambrdige economist, Frank Hahn, who said "the problem with mathematical economists is that even if they found something really important they would not know". If you keep ideas abstract without applying them you do not make progress.
[MN] You have personally experienced criminals trying to communicate with you. Tell us what happened and how it fits in with your theory.
[DG] Soon after completing my field work in Palermo in 1987 I was threatened over the phone by means of a riddle. The anonymous caller who had a slight Sicilian accent was able to track down the phone number of my appartment in Rome. Without introducing himself, he first asked me whether he was speaking to such and such telephone number. That was a good signal that he had indeed intended to call my number rather than making a mistake. They then asked a bizarre question: "Am I talking to the church of La Madonna del Riposo?" After my baffled denial he asked: "Do you happen to know where it is located?" I looked up the church soon after I hung up and a quick look in the phone book revealed that the church was located in the cemetery near to where I lived. I should say that one should be very prudent interpreting these events, there is a small possibility that this was a mad man. And one should be careful to not get too paranoid.
In fact paranoia plagues the mafia quite a lot and leads them to make mistakes; to mistake innocent events as signals. The fear of having other people make those mistakes about you is one of the reasons they have a certain fixity in their gaze, a certain simplicity in dress and a remarkable precision in speech which is not typical of Italians. Given where this happened, where at the point in my field work in which I had already had some weak signs of this, it made me think: these guys are really weird but also very subtle. Using such an indirect way to threaten people is a way to let people know what you want them to know and to understand if they need to understand without making yourself impeachable, without revealing anything more about you. It may also be that it makes it all the more threatening. I probably became paranoid after that and I am persuaded that I was followed very closely after that at least once. Anyway, this episode contributed to my interest in signalling.
Lessons we can draw for the rest of the economy [MN] What lessons can we draw from your research that can be applied to other areas of the economy?
[DG] Some of the things I say about committing joint misdeeds or showing each other misdeeds may be applied to explain loyalty within perfectly legal groups like the police. Policemen, for example, may often breach their regulations and they know about each others breaches and that generates some loyalty. I'm not sure my work can tell you about industrial sectors of a perfectly legal nature. It would help you more if you are a behavioural or development economist or in situations in which the law does not work well and trust does not flow well.
[MN] And in showing how economic models can be applied successfully to sociology you are reinforcing the fruitfulness of the models.
[DG] You know that economics has been accused of being imperialist from Gary Becker on and to try and invade fields traditionally convered by other social sciences. May be I am a well disguised undercover agent for economic imperialism. Joking apart, when it comes to explaining behaviour, I try to go for a theory that works regardless of turf considerations.
What can economists contribute?
[MN] I understand that you think there is room for economists to contribute to your field of research. Are there any contemporary economists already working in the area? What research questions might an economist start looking at?
[DG] The real forefather of this way of thinking is Thomas Schelling who always had an interest in extreme types of organisation including criminals because he was interested in international relations which are not that dissimilar because of their rawness and a lack of institutional fabric linking together disparate countries.
There is an important book by Avinash Dixit called Lawlessness and Economics (Dixit, 2004) which uses some of my early work on the sicilian mafia and tries to model all the ways, other than the law, that are found to govern exchange. Fiorentina and Peltzman use economic theory in their book The Economics of Organised Crime (Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995) to analyse parts of organised crime such as market behaviour and organisational rules. Baccara and Bar-Isaac at NYU try to model the trade off between a centralised organisation and a constellation of cell organisations (Baccara and Bar-Isaac, 2008) . Other interesting work relevant to the study of organised crime has been done by (Bandiera, 2003) and (Anderson and Bandiera, 2006) . The first paper by Oriana explicitly tests the theory on the origins of the Sicilian mafia which I put forward in my earlier book.
But there is a lot of work to be done. When working in this area economists should keep their nose to the ground. That is, to imagine situations which are stylised for a good reason -not just to make any model work.
There is quite a lot of work to be done on interpersonal violence and on the perverse effect of punishment. That is when punishment becomes a signal that you are a wicked criminal. It acts inadvertently as a credential device. Crime and punishment is an interesting broad research agenda in which our basic thinking is really crude. Most societies whether criminal or state have this notion that the more you punish the more you deter -you deter the person who is punished and others who observe the punishment. You may attach to that the probability of being caught and then you have expected cost of punishment but punishment is a more subtle affair that has adverse effects. Some economists have done some work on this (Chen and Shapiro, 2003) . They have looked at people who have received exactly the same sentence for exactly the same crime but some random device in the system sends some to the stricter regime prison and some to the weaker regime prison. The guys that go to the strict regime prison reoffend more than the guys who are sent to the weak regime prison.
Introduction
In times of financial turmoil monetary policy responses are of special interest for the academic community. This was especially the case after the Asian crisis of 1997-8, when the Bank of Japan (BoJ) cut interest rates down to zero. In the US, first the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000 and now the subprime market crisis justified sharp interest rate cuts to stabilize markets, which brought world interest rates close to zero. In this regard, an increasing number of authors argue that in the past interest rates were not increased symmetrically when markets stabilized and boomed. Accordingly, interest rates remained too low for too long. This provided low-cost liquidity to flourishing markets (Belke et al., 2008; Taylor, 2009; Schnabl and Hoffmann, 2008; Weber, 2008) . The aim of this paper is to test for asymmetric monetary policy with respect to asset markets as described by these authors.
The analysis follows the methodology of Danne and Schnabl (Danne and Schnabl, 2008) . They show that due to a "fear of appreciation" against the dollar the BoJ lowered interest rates in appreciation periods in the 1990s to support growth. However, it did not increase interest rates in depreciation periods to the same extent to keep the economy competitive. Thus, the BoJ systematically lowered interest rates until they reached the zero bound.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the model. In section 3, the data and methodology are presented. In section 4, tests are carried out to determine whether the Fed reacted asymmetrically towards positive and negative deviations of asset market developments. Section 5 concludes.
The model
To test for asymmetric monetary policy decisions with respect to asset markets, we use a monetary policy reaction function based on Danne and Schnabl (Danne and Schnabl, 2008) . Their model builds upon the forward-looking rule of Clarida et al. (Clarida et al., 1998) but includes asset prices and a dummy to isolate the effect of positive and negative asset price deviations:
The equation shows the decision parameters for the central bank to set its nominal interest rate i in time t. The decision depends on future inflation, π t+12 (twelve months ahead) as well as the gap between optimum output y * t and the actual output y t . The coefficients β and γ weight the importance of inflation and output gap for setting the nominal interest rate. John Taylor (Taylor, 1993) , who introduced the Taylor rule approximated β to be 1.5 and γ to be 0.5 in the US.
The policy rule further includes a deviation of asset market developments p t from their optimum path p * t . As this paper aims to find evidence of whether the Fed responds differently towards positive and negative asset market deviations, a threshold dummy is included in the model. 2 The dummy D is 0, when asset prices are above the optimum path( p t > p * t ). The dummy D is 1, when asset price deviations from the optimum path are negative ( p t < p * t ). Thereby,µ represents the additional effect for monetary policy coming from asset price busts. Further, ρ accounts for the level of interest rate smoothing as it is not assumed that policy rates will fluctuate strongly. This would destabilize an economy. The parameter for interest rate smoothing is between 0 and 1 (Clarida et al., 1998) . The closer ρ is to 1 the higher the degree of interest rate smoothing. The error term v t is assumed to be normally distributed.
Data and methodology
The equation is estimated using monthly data taken from the IMFs International Financial Statistics. Industrial production replaces real GDP, due to data availability. The federal funds rate, year-over-year consumer price inflation (CPI), the all shares index (as a measure of asset prices) and industrial production data from January 1957 to March 2008 is used.
The output gap and asset market gap are calculated by subtracting the year-over-year logdifferences of industrial production and stock prices from their trends (Bjørnland et al., 2008) , which are approximated by the H-P filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) . At the 10 percent significance level, the Dickey-Fuller test did not identify unit roots in CPI, output gap, or asset market gaps.
A two-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework is applied as it controls for endogeneity of the parameters (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) . Newey West standard errors provide robust residuals. Using realized 12-month forward inflation rates and calculated output gaps in the regression to estimate the model assumes that expectations of policy makers are accurate in forecasting the variables, which is the standard approach in the literature.
As widely used when estimating Taylor rules, lags of the regressors of up to twelve periods (one year) and a constant are used as instruments. The impact of asset prices for future output and inflation is taken account for by including asset prices as instruments (Siklos et al., 2004)(Fuhrer and Tootell 2004) . Because more orthogonality conditions (instruments) than needed are used to estimate the parameters, Sargan (Sargan, 1958 ) and Hansen (Hansen, 1982) suggest a test that proves whether all sample moments are close to zero. The J-statistic must be multiplied with the number of observations. If the respective value is smaller than the critical value of the χ 2 (p − q) the null hypothesis of validity of instruments is not rejected.
Estimation results
The model is estimated for three periods. Period 1 represents the whole sample. However, monetary policy frameworks change over time. Thus, sub-samples are estimated as well. The period before August 1979 is not estimated separately. It represents a period of macroeconomic instability due to the oil price shocks; and the monetary policy was structurally different due to the Bretton Woods system. Therefore, we chose two alternative periods corresponding to different chairmen of the Fed after 1979: Period 2 represents the Volcker era ranging from August 1979 to August 1987. The Volcker era is assumed to be an era of monetary stability. The Greenspan era, including the first months of Bernanke's incumbency represents period 3 ranging from August 1987 to March 2008. Standard errors in parentheses, ***,**,* denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Test for over-identifying restrictions: J-statistics multiplied by the number of observations is always smaller than χ 2 (27).
In Table 1 , α is a constant and ρ indicates the impact of interest rates smoothing. The constant remains less important. However, past interest rates had a strong impact on interest rate setting. The coefficients β for inflation and γ for the output gap are similar to those known from other papers (Clarida et al., 1998; Dupor and Conley, 2004; Danne and Schnabl, 2008 ); and on the same level as proposed by Taylor (Taylor, 1993) . Inflation seems to be the most important goal and is significant at the 1 percent level. Asset prices turn out to affect monetary policy during the Greenspan/Bernanke era. 3 This result is robust for different sets of instruments and other estimation methods (OLS, 2SLS, 3SLS and one-step GMM). 4 As δ represents the coefficient for positive asset price deviations and µ the difference to δ, when asset price deviations are negative, the total coefficient of negative asset price deviations during the Greenspan/ Bernanke period is equal to the sum of the coefficients δ and µ. In order to decide whether the cumulated coefficient is significant, its t-statistic has to be calculated as follows:
The joint t-statistic for negative asset price deviations is positive and significant at the five percent level. Therefore, the estimation indicates that the Fed reacted asymmetrically towards positive and negative asset price deviations from the late 1980s onward.
Shifts in monetary policy goals
Thus far, the results indicate that the impact of asset prices on monetary policy decisions was weak during the Volcker era, but increased when Greenspan came into office. A rolling regression is a useful tool to illustrate these changes over time and identify structural breaks. Therefore, the model is estimated as a rolling regression of a ten year moving window (120 months), starting with the period from January 1957 to January 1967 and moving forward to the period from March 1998 to March 2008. Smaller window sizes may help with checking the accuracy. They yield very similar results, but worsen robustness. Additionally, the asset price gaps used in the equation have been calculated for each estimated period. Figure 1 illustrates the rolling t-statistics for µ coming from a rolling regression of the model. As explained above, the Pre-Volcker era is not our main focus, though significance fluctuates strongly before 1979. This changed with the incumbency of Paul Volcker as chairman of the Fed who first addressed inflation as a problem to be solved by raising real interest rates. As the regression rolls out of the pre-Volcker era, the results change and become more stable.
During the Volcker-era negative asset price deviations had no significant impact on monetary policy. This is in line with the static estimations and implies that between 1979 and 1987 asset price deviations were not a major issue for monetary policy decisions. With Greenspan in office, this changes. First, the rolling regression implies that an asset price bust in the early nineties (following the Japanese crisis of 1990) had an impact on monetary policy decisions. As the Japanese crisis threatened economic growth and stability, central bankers reacted towards falling asset markets during this period.
Up to the year 2000, asset prices played a minor role for the Fed. On the contrary, the t-statistics change when the regression includes the period after the burst of the dot-com bubble. For the estimations starting in January 1993 January 2003 t-statistics stay above the fivepercent significance levels. The Fed adjusted interest rates downwards as the dot-com bubble burst. The recovery after 2003, again, had no impact on interest rate setting. During the recovery that began in 2003, the Fed kept interest rates at lower levels than would be predicted by a Taylor rule that does not include asset prices (Taylor, 2009 ).
Summary and outlook
In this paper we have tested for an asymmetric monetary policy behavior with respect to asset markets in the US.
The estimation results suggest that the Fed lowered interest rates, when asset markets burst, but did not raise them when they boomed during the Greenspan era. Specifically, the Fed reacted asymmetrically with respect to the stock market after the dot-com bubble when interest rates were not raised in accordance with the recovery to keep the economy going.
Given the experience of the 1929 stock market crash that was followed by the Great Depression, this behavior is not surprising. It goes along with the Jackson Hole Consensus view of American central bankers which proposes that monetary policy should not attempt to burst bubbles (Blinder and Reis, 2005) . Prospect Theory may provide a rationale (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . As central bankers act under uncertainty, they give negative future events undue weight in their assessment relative to positive asset price developments. Thus the fear of depression causes asymmetric behavior.
However, this holds some severe risks. Even though the Fed supported growth successfully and kept inflation low, predictable interest rate cuts may cause moral hazard, as cuts may be anticipated and higher risks are thus taken by the market players. In the light of the current crisis, this is especially true for banks that are now assured to be too important for the system to fail. As the interest rate level declines due to asymmetric policy behaviour, lower interest rates may promote credit expansions and bad investment. Meanwhile, the rather expansionary monetary policies after 2001 possibly contributed to "vagabonding bubbles" around the globe (Schnabl and Hoffmann, 2008) . In this sense it seems appropriate to concur with Axel Weber's (Weber, 2008) argument that interest rates have to be symmetrically raised and lowered to reduce the probability of bubbles and stop the downward-trend in interest rates.
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Financial interlocking and insider lending as an institutional rigidity
Economists working on development issues have now realised that sustained growth performance is not simply due to technological progress contingent on spillovers or learning from the industrialised word. There are serious institutional preconditions, which affect first of all the costs of such transfers and more importantly the long-term benefits that a country can obtain. Furthermore, the 'right' institutional setting is not universal for each country, but may well be country-specific in response to existing rigidities and constraints (Rodrik, 2009) . Interlocking or the spread of personal connections in an economy and society is one of those institutional rigidities. Widely modelled with network analysis it was used by sociologists to trace the strength and depth of personal connections in an economy, amongst the members of political/economic elites or social groups. The economic literature has modelled this phenomenon as a response to information problems or a way of decreasing transaction and monitoring costs in economic interaction (Porta et al., 2002) . Finance and banking historians have taken this point to explain the emergence of relationship banking and analyse its effects on economic development (Lamoreaux, 1994) . The process through which early banks formed a network of firms that benefited from access to their capital has been termed director interlocking, where financiers and industrialists will sit in the same boards of directors to ensure proper use of loans (monitoring costs for the former) and access to them (search costs for the latter).
Economic theories dealing with information problems (Akerlof, 1970) have been suggested in early scholarly work on development in relative backwardness (Gerschenkron, 1962) as explanations for the rise of interlocking directorates. High-risk economic environments characterised by capital shortage, as developing countries are often described, often support the evolution of universal or relationship type banking systems (Wellhoner and Wixforth, 1989) . These usually combined the commercial and investment arms of banks, but also pursued long-term relationships with their clients as a way of alleviating information asymmetries and minimising monitoring costs. This effectively created interlocked networks. The bank-industry relationship runs in both directions: firms in need of liquidity desire close association with a financial institution, while banks seek long-term links to selected firms, as a commitment device.
This paper uses two new datasets to trace the persistence of interlocking in the Bulgarian industrial and financial structures and test its influence on the performance of the bank- Source: USA, Mizruchi (1996) , Bulgaria: see text ing system during the Interwar Period. The econometric test proxies interlocking with insider lending, defined in detail in the section below. The hypothesis put forward states that insider loans were detrimental to banking profitability and this is suggested as one channel through which institutional rigidity may affect development. Economic theory suggests that insider lending tends to restrict lending to a small circle of clients (Porta et al., 2002) . Furthermore, interlocked agents tend to prioritise their payoff from industrial projects rather then their share in the banks' equity. This compromises banks' liquidity through irregular debt repayment, a process called "tunnelling" by Johnson et al. (2000) .
Interlocked Networks in Bulgaria in an International Perspective
As suggested by (Porta et al., 2002) , insider debtors are defined as those who receive financing from a bank and are:
1. shareholder, director or officers of the bank;
2. family members of shareholders, directors or officers of the bank;
3. firms where the previous two categories of individuals are officers or directors; or 4. firms where the bank itself owns shares.
Such links are used to identify interlocked institutions in this section, while a methodology of tracing the lending policy of banks and identifying insider loans has been used to construct the interlocked variable in the section to follow. (Avramov, 2007) has argued, largely relying on anecdotal and qualitative evidence, that insider lending due to constrained credit was widespread in the Interwar Bulgarian banking sector. Data collected on interlocked clusters within a selected sample of sectors for the Bulgarian economy has allowed an initial quantitative look at the phenomenon of interlocking. 1 A second dataset -providing information of the level of insider lending within the private banking sector -is the basis of an econometric test to further the argument of the negative influence of the interlocking phenomenon.
Table 1 provides a comparison of the level of interlocking, measured by the average number of director interlocks per firm, between Bulgaria and the USA, an economy of the developed core. In the pre-1914 period, the business elites of underdeveloped Bulgaria were not as coherently united as in the USA. There is some convergence during the Interwar Period, but at no stage does the average number of interlocks for the whole economy, as represented by the sample of sectors, become higher than in the USA. The banking, insurance and industry sectors, however, had overtaken their counterparts in the USA by the 1930s in terms of network connections. A very Scott and Griff (1984) , USA -Mizruchi (1996) well integrated trade and transport sector in the US seems to affect the total. Economic theory might suggest a very speculative hypothesis about the evolution of firm-level connections. As an economy passes some initial threshold of development, firms endeavour to solve information problems in their profit-seeking behaviour by entering into interlocked networks. Further along the path of development, as markets and financial services become more sophisticated and better regulated, the cost of information decreases, or is more efficiently transmitted through the intermediation of trustworthy financial institutions. This causes a gradual decrease in the networks of interlocked firms. This story is told by Lamoreaux (1994) , in her analysis of financial institutions in early 19 th century East-Coast US. An inter-country comparison can be made, looking at density of business networks, for a select group of countries, where such data is available. The density of interlocked networks (see table 2 below) is defined as the ratio between existing connections and all possible connections within the network. By the 1920s, except for the UK, there does not appear to have been any difference between the economically developed core (represented by the US) and the countries in the European periphery (Bulgaria and Sweden). Table 3 provides a breakdown of the clusters of interlocked networks in pre-1945 Bulgaria. These are broadly defined according to the profession of the directors who are at the heart of an interlocked network, their location of social activity, or other economic reasons, like vertical integration of their production process. As expected, need for credit put bankers in a privileged position to form interlocking networks.
Interlocking was clearly a phenomenon which appeared across economies in a variety of institutional settings. Its spread and depth did change through time, suggesting that it depended on the level of institutional development. It also seems to have been most widespread across sectors where information problems tend to be most severe, like insurance and banking, or amongst professional groups, for instance managerial elites, where there are large benefits to be gained from close network connections.
Insider lending as a detriment to bank profitability
This part uses a second dataset containing a representative cross-section of the private banking sector in 1930 Bulgaria to investigate the influence that interlocking had on banking performance. The data includes the detailed balances for 1930 for 101 banks. The model of bank profitability is a standard specification, often used in the econometric literature (see Okazaki et al. (2005) ). It uses a number of well-known measures to account for the performance of banks. Amongst these are the scale of banks, the level of competition and attitudes to risk (Smirlock, 1985) . The share of insider loans of each bank is used to account for the effects of interlocking. The presence of foreign investors in the bank's balance sheet is expected to have boosted liquidity. The dependent variable is return on equity -a measure of profitability used by a number of studies (Goddard et al., 2004) . Due to lack of data on the dividends paid out by banks a proxy is used -the ratio between profit/loss for Dependent variable ROE2 ROE: as a measure of profitability; proxied by a ratio of profits over set up capital plus reserves (ROE 2); Ideally, ROE should be calculated using data from stock returns (dividend over the value of stock), however due to data limitations, the ratio of profit over capital is used.
Loan quality Interlock2
Percentage of insider loans from total loans. Table 5 presents the results of the regression analysis. The coefficient of Interlock2 is negative across all regressions and significant for regressions of the whole sample, small banks and banks with no foreign investor present. The results show that insider lending was not statistically significant for the large banks (capital over 10 mln leva) and the ones with foreign capital (external investor present). This may be accounted for by better transparency and more rigorous shareholder control, especially in banks where an external investor was present. The positive and significant coefficients on lnSize across all regressions suggest that economies of scale matter. Too much competition was bad news for bank profits during the depression, suggested by the highly significant and negative coefficient. The risk attitude variable, Levd, is statistically significant. Leveraged position caused distress to (robust std. errors used, ***-significant to 1%, ** -significant to 5%, * -significant to 10%; ( -) -coefficient is negative; --no regression for this part of the sample) banks as the economic slowdown began. Foreign capital is only significant at the 10 % confidence level and only in the regression of the whole sample. Size rather than presence of external investor was what mattered for profits of large Bulgarian banks.
A number of issues may be affecting the results of the above test. First, we investigated the robustness of the regression results to alternative measures of interlocking. Using Interlock1 (defined as percentage of insider loans from total assets) provided quantitatively very similar results as in table 5 above. Second, attitude to risk is difficult to measure. Given the data available from bank balances, we constructed a number of variables, out of which Levd performed best in the regressions.
Finally, the standard OLS specification used here may cause problems with identification, omitted variable bias or measurement errors. Given the historical nature of the data, measurement error issues are not addressed. It is also possible that the regression results above are affected by correlation of the explanatory variables with unobserved country or bank specific effects, which induces an omitted variable bias. Extending the model to include further control variables, or creating a panel fixed effects model can take account of this. Again, data limitations and the length of the study prevents us from using these methods. Therefore, the results of our OLS specification suggest a negative correlation between interlocking and bank profitability, rather than a unidirectional causality. To argue for the latter, an instrumental variables approach may be more appropriate to take account of reverse causality issues, i.e. banks with lower profitability actively seeking opportunities to link themselves with specific clients for information benefits.
Conclusions and suggestions for further research
Economic theory suggests that it is dangerous for banks to try and ensure more secure returns by channelling funds to insiders' projects because insider agents expect to receive a higher payoff from their enterprise rather than their equity in the bank. This provides an incentive to drain the bank's liquidity, even if funding a losing enterprise.
An econometric test on the Bulgarian banking system in 1930 confirms the conclusion of the theoretical setting -interlocking and insider lending contributed to the inefficiencies and lowprofitability of a financial system in an underdeveloped state. The descriptive statistics in the first part of the paper suggest a more complicated story. Closer network connections may, indeed, arise as a result of costly information problems, at an early stage of industrial and financial development. At some stage of a country's economic development, the sophistication of intermediary institutions becomes enough to partially offset such costs and interlocking decreases as a phenomenon. To fully understand its spread and consequences, there is a need of further comparative work, and an increased time component in the analysis, which will allow to observe the effects of interlocked networks during Kiril Kossev (kiril.kossev@nuffield.ox.ac.uk) is a DPhil candidate in Economic History at Nuffield College, Oxford. His current research interests include international capital flows in the Interwar Period, especially effects on host country productivity. More broadly he is interested in long-term economic growth, financial institutions and growth, and industrialisation of the European Periphery. He holds a BA in History and Economics and an MSc in Economic History with distinction from Hertford College, Oxford.
